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Games and Weak-Head Reduction forClassical PCFHugo Herbelin ?LITP, University Paris 7, 2 place Jussieu, 75252 Paris Cedex 05, FranceINRIA-Rocquencourt, B.P. 105, 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex, FranceHugo.Herbelin@inria.frAbstract. We present a game model for classical PCF, a nite versionof PCF extended by a catch/throw mechanism. This model is buildfrom E-dialogues, a kind of two-players game dened by Lorenzen. Inthe E-dialogues for classical PCF, the strategies of the rst player areisomorphic to the Bohm trees of the language.We dene an interaction in E-dialogues and show that it models theweak-head reduction in classical PCF. The interaction is a variant ofCoquand's debate and the weak-head reduction is a variant of the re-duction in Krivine's Abstract Machine.We then extend E-dialogues to a kind of games similar to Hyland-Ong'sgames. Interaction in these games also models weak-head reduction. Inthe intuitionistic case (i.e. without the catch/throw mechanism), theextended E-dialogues are Hyland-Ong's games where the innocence con-dition on strategies is now a rule.Our model for classical PCF is dierent from Ong's model of Parigot'slambda-mu-calculus. His model works by adding new moves to the intu-itionistic case while ours works by relaxing the game rules.IntroductionWe investigate the links between Lorenzen's and Coquand's game-theoretic ap-proach of provability, Hyland-Ong's game-theoretic approach of -calculus, andweak-head reduction as implemented by Krivine's Abstract Machine.To exemplify these links, we choose as framework the nite Bohm trees of avariant of PCF extended by a catch/throw mechanism. This variant of PCF isclassical in the sense that its typing system includes implicational classical logic.We refer to Felscher [8] for the works of Lorenzen and his school. Accordingto Felscher, the goal of Lorenzen was to give a game-based foundation of in-tuitionistic logic. Several kinds of two-players games parametrized by formulaswere dened. Of these games, we note one in particular, called E-dialogues inFelscher [8]. As noticed by Lorenzen & Schwemmer [16], the strategies for therst player in E-dialogues have a structure of proofs in a certain cut-free sequent? This research was partly supported by ESPRIT Basic Research Action \Types forProofs and Programs" and by Programme de Recherche Coordonnees \Mecanisationdu raisonnement".
calculus. The propositional fragment of this calculus is described in [10]. It is avariant of Gentzen's calculus LJ.More generally, we call E-dialogue the kind of game which game-theoreticallyexpresses the terms or proofs typed by a system having the subformula property.In particular, Coquand's games [3] (inspired from Gentzen [2]) for innitarypropositional logic are E-dialogues. Similarly, the typing system of Bohm treesfor PCF has the subformula property and we can dene E-dialogues for PCF.We focus in section 1 on Bohm trees for classical PCF. Before dening E-dialogues for classical PCF, we dene in section 2 a generic notion of two-playersgames parametrized by types. It's only by restricting the rules of the genericgames that we get E-dialogues (see section 3). An isomorphism between Bohmtrees for classical PCF and strategies for the rst player in E-dialogues can nowbe stated. However, the rules of the E-dialogues are not the same for both players.So we dene in section 4 spread E-dialogues where the players have dual roles.In spread E-dialogues both the strategies of the rst player and of the secondplayer are in one-to-one correspondence with Bohm trees.In section 5, we recover E-dialogues and spread E-dialogues for intuitionisticPCF by another extra restriction, called last asked rst answered condition. In-tuitionistic spread E-dialogues are Hyland-Ong's dialogues where the innocencecondition on strategies is now a rule of the game. The observation that the lastasked rst answered condition distinguishes between classical and intuitionistictype systems comes from Lorenz [13].It is possible to dene an interaction between strategies in an E-dialogue (in away similar to Coquand's interaction [3]), but also in a spread E-dialogue (in thiscase it is just a \ping-pong"-like process). On the other side, we can evaluate theapplication of a Bohm tree to another by using a variant of Krivine's AbstractMachine. This is the weak-head reduction. We show that both interactions modelthe weak-head reduction.The correspondence between weak-head reduction and interaction in Hyland-Ong's style of games is also proven in Danos et al [6]. The framework was thesimply-typed pure -calculus and the starting point was the analogy betweenthe justication pointers in Hyland-Ong's games and the pointers introduced inDanos & Regnier [7] to implement Krivine's Abstract Machine.A game-theoretic model of simply-typed pure -calculus (see Parigot [18])has been given by Ong [17]. It derives from the intuitionistic game by addingnew moves. In contrast, our model for classical PCF results from a liberalizationof the rules of the intuitionistic game.Interaction between strategies can be formalized through abstract machinestoo. The relations between these machines and Krivine's Abstract Machine areshown in [5].1 Classical Simply-Typed Bohm TreesWe consider a language of Bohm trees for a simply-typed -calculus includingconstants, a case operator and a catch/throwmechanism (with static binding).
We adopt for the catch and throw operators a syntax (and later a behaviour)reminiscent of Parigot's -calculus [18]. The operator catch is written and the operator throw is written []. Classical Bohm trees are dened by thefollowing grammar:t ::= case x(u; :::; u) of (c! t; :::; c! t) j []cu ::= x; :::; x::tThe letters x and  range over two distinct domains of names and c over theconstants in the base types. The x's are called -variables. They are supposed tobe distinct in the expression x; :::; x::. The 's are called -variables (theyroughly correspond to entry points of (local) functions). In the case construct,the c's are supposed to be distinct and the t's are called continuations.We willoften use a vector notation as in ~x::t or case x(~u) of (~c! ~t).The objects dened by the entries t and u are respectively called classicalevaluable Bohm trees and classical functional Bohm trees.Our Bohm trees are simply-typed. Types are built on a family VC of basetypes, each one being inhabited by a nite number of elements. The followinggrammar denes types A ::= A; :::; A!Cwhere the sequence A; :::; A may be empty and where C ranges over VC .In a type A = B1; :::; Bp!C the base type C is called conclusion of A andeach Bi is called premise of A.The typing system has two kinds of sequents. The sequents (  ` ) typeevaluable Bohm trees and the sequents (  ` ;A) type functional Bohm trees.The   's are sequences of types annotated by -variables. The 's are sequencesof base types annotated by -variables. The typing rules are:t : ( ;Ax11 ; :::; Axnn ` ;C)x1; :::; xn::t : (  ` ;A1; :::; An!C) Abs c is in C[]c : (  ` ;C) Cstu1 : (  ` ;A1) : : : un : (  ` ;An) t1 : (  ` ) : : : tp : (  ` )case x(u1; :::; un) of (c1 ! t1; :::; cp! tp) : (  ` ) Appwith (A1; :::; An!C)x in   and C = fc1; :::; cpg.If u : (`;A), we say that u is a closed Bohm tree of type A.Remarks: 1) The extension to innite set of constants and/or to non well-founded Bohm trees poses no diculties. The extension to Bohm trees withundened nodes is also direct.2) We justify our langage of Bohm trees as follows. Let
t ::= x j (t t) j x:tj c j case t of (c! t; :::; c! t)j catcht j throwtbe a grammar for a nite version of PCF with a catch/throw mechanism. Infact, we intend catcht to represent the construction []t of -calculus andthrowt the construction []t with  not in t. This is justied by the followingderived rule of -calculus ( and  not in t)E([]E0([]t))! E(t)where E and E0 are applicative contexts and []t is in evaluation positionin E0.Consider the theory of -calculus with constants and case operators(x:t u) = t[x :=u]t = x:(t x) x fresh for tt = case t of (~c! ~c)case ci of (~c! ~t) = ti(case t of (~c! ~u) v) = case t of (~c!   !(u v))case (case t of (~c! ~t)) of (~c0 ! ~t0) = case t of (~c!              !case t of (~c0 ! ~t0))enriched by equations coming from the theory of -calculust = catcht  fresh for t(catcht u) = catch(t[throwv :=throw(v u)] u)(throwt u) = throwtcase (catcht) of (~c! ~u) = catch(case t0 of (~c! ~u))where t0 = t[throwv :=throw(case v of (~c! ~u))]case (throwt) of (~c! ~u) = throwtthrow(case t of (~c! ~t)) = case t of (~c!      !throwt)throw(throwt) = throwtthrow(catcht) = throw(t[ :=])catch(catcht) = catch(t[ :=])catchc = catchthrowcwhere the various substitutions are dened as in Parigot [18] (replacing throwby []).Orient the rules from left to right to get a rewriting system. We can showthat any typed term reduced to a typed Bohm tree. Up to the 2nd, 3rd and7th rules, typed Bohm trees are normal. Thus, assuming the conuence of therewriting system, the typed Bohm trees describe the equivalence classes of typedterms. This justies the terminology.3) According to the theory of -calculus in Parigot [18], any term of the form[]t is equivalent to [][]t with  fresh for t. This justies to abbreviateour catcht (i.e. []t) by :t and our throwt (i.e. []t with  not in t)by []t.A precise study of the relations between -calculus and -calculus extendedby catch and throw can be found in Crolard [4].
Numeric Bohm trees are a special case of Bohm trees. In numeric Bohmtrees, the -variables range over pairs of natural numbers and -variables onnatural numbers. We will use numeric Bohm trees in section 3.1 to prove thecorrespondence with strategies. The numbers are imposed by the following an-notated typing system:t : ( ; A( p1 )1 ; :::;A( pn )n p̀ ;C)( p1 ); :::; ( pn )::t : (  p̀ ;A1; :::;An!C) Abs c is in C[p]c : (  p̀ ;Cp) Cstu1 : (  p+1` ;A1) : : : un : (  p+1` ;An) t1 : (  p+1` ) : : : tp : (  p+1` )case ( qj )(u1; :::; un) of (c1 ! t1; :::; cp ! tp) : (  p̀ ) Appwith (A1; :::;An!C)( qj ) in   and C = fc1; :::; cpg.1.1 Weak-Head ReductionWe now dene a computation on classical Bohm trees: the weak-head computa-tion of a functional Bohm tree applied to arguments which are themselves Bohmtrees. For this purpose, we dene a variant of Krivine's Abstract Machine. Themachine is described in a syntax reminiscent of -calculi (see Abadi et al [1]),in the style of Leroy [12] or Hardin et al [9].s ::= t[e]e ::= w; :::;ww ::= (~x ~u; []~c! ~t)[e]A state of the machine (entry s of the grammar) consists of an evaluableBohm tree in an environment. An environment e is a sequence of windows.A window w contains bindings of two kinds. First the bindings of variables toarguments. Second the bindings of a -variable and of constants to continuations.Both terms and continuations of a window have meaning in an environment localto them.There are two kinds of rules. The rst rule applies when the computationneeds to know the value of a variable xij. If xij is bound to uij = ~y::t0 ine then its arguments ~u are bound to the formal parameters ~y and the currentcontinuation ~t (what to do when t0 returns a constant) is bound to the entrypoint  of uij.case xij(~u) of (~c! ~t)[e] wh!1 t0[(~y  ~u; []~c! ~t)[e]; ei]with e = w1; :::;wr and wi = (~xi  ~ui; [i]~ci ! ~ti)[ei] and uij = ~y::t0.The second rule applies when a constant is return to some entry point.
[i]cj [e] wh!1 tij [ei]with e = w1; :::;wr and wi = (~xi  ~ui; [i]~ci ! ~ti)[ei].The weak-head reduction works by repeatedly applying the two rules. Letu0 =  ~x0:0:t0 be a Bohm tree of type ~A!C and ~v0 a family of Bohm treesof respective types A1; :::; An. The weak-head reduction of u0 applied to ~v0is the following sequence:r0 = t0[( ~x0  ~v0; [0])[ ] wh!1 r1 wh!1 ::: wh!1 rn wh!1 :::The symbol  denotes the empty sequence of continuations bindings. Whenu0 and ~v0 are closed (both for -variables and -variables), only the constantsreturned on 0 are not bound in the environment. This property is preservedfrom step to step. Thus, if it stops, the sequence stops in a state of the form[0]ci [e]. Since no continuation is bound to [0]ci, no reduction rule applies.Remark: Our machine arises as a stack-free form of Krivine's Abstract Machine.The typing ensures that the arity of arguments always matches the arity offormal parameters. This is what allows to avoid a stack. The way to handle caseoperators without stack comes from [5]. More generally, we refer to [5] for acomparison of our machine with Danos-Regnier Pointer Abstract Machine (see[7, 6]) and for an extension to pure -calculus. A short proof of correctness ofthe machine w.r.t. Coquand's debate (as done in section 3.2) also appears in [5].2 GamesGames interpret types. If A is a type, we write GA the game which interprets it.It is a game between two players called Player and Opponent. Moves consist inattacks of subtypes of A or in answers to attacks. Plays are alternating sequencesof numbered Player's and Opponent's moves starting from an initial attack of Aby Opponent.Assume A is B1; :::; Bn ! C0. The initial attack of A is written [ andnumbered 0. This attack means both a question on the conclusion C0 of A andthe assertion of the premises Bi of A. All subsequent attacks are written [pi .The exponent p is called justication. It is a reference to a previous attack ofthe other player, say the attack of B01; :::; B0n!C 0. This attack was asserting B01,...,B0n and i is the index of one of the B01, ..., B0n. Here again, the attack meansboth a question on the conclusion of B0i and the assertion of each premise of B0i.An attack is waiting for an answer. An answer is written ]pc . The exponentp is also a justication. It corresponds to the number of the attack to whichit answers. This attack was questioning a base type, say C 00 and c is a constantin C 00.Formally, the game GA is a set of legal positions on A. A legal positionon A is a nite or innite sequence d0d1d2::: of moves. For n  1, it may beconvenient to write dn as mpnn . The number pn is the justication and mn is
either [i or ]c. To be a legal position, the sequence has to satisfy the followingproperties:- Initial attack of OpponentWe have d0 = [.- Moves are justied by previous moves of the other playerFor all n > 0, pn is less than n and of distinct parity.- Correctness of attacksFor n  1, if dn = [pi , the move dp is an attack of some typeB1; :::; Bm ! C and 1  i  m. We say that dn is an attack ofBi.- Correctness of answersFor n  1, if dn = ]pc , the move dp is an attack of some typeB1; :::; Bm!C and c is in C.The moves dn, with n odd, are called Player's moves or P-moves and theones with n even are called Opponent's moves or O-moves.2.1 StrategiesUnformally, a strategy for a player is a function mapping legal positions (atwhich the player is to move) to a move of this player. In a legal position, onlythe moves of the other player are useful to determine what to move. This leadsto the following denition.Assume A is B1; :::; Bn0!C. A P-strategy (resp O-strategy)  for GA isa function which maps nite sequences of O-moves (resp P-moves) to P-moves(resp O-moves). The domainDom() of  is structured as a tree. It satises thefollowing clauses:- For a P -strategy: the sequence reduced to the single O-move [ is inDom().- For an O-strategy: the one-P-move sequences ]0c (with c in C0) and [0i (with1  i  n0) are in Dom().- If the sequence d0d1:::dn is in Dom() then,1- d0(d0)d1:::dn(d0:::dn) forms a legal position,2- d0d1:::dn+1 is in Dom() if and only if d0(d0)d1:::dn(d0:::dn)dn+1forms a legal position.P-strategies are strategies for Player while O-strategies are strategies forOpponent.Alternatively, a P-strategy can be seen as a (possibly innite) tree wherebranches are labelled by O-moves and nodes by P-moves. Moreover, it makessense to restrict a strategy to what it determines after some point in a play. Thisleads to the denition of substrategy in tree form beyond a legal position.A P-substrategy in tree form beyond  is inductively dened by:
Let d be a P-move such that d is legal. If, for any O-move d0 such thatdd0 is legal, d0 is a P-substrategy beyond dd0, then the tree (d; (d0)d0 )is a P-substrategy beyond .The move d labels the root node of the tree and the d0 are the branches.When no O-move is allowed after d, the family (d0 )d0 is empty and the P-substrategy is restricted to a leaf. A P-strategy in tree form is a P-substrategyin tree form beyond the legal position restricted to the initial move [.Proposition1. There is a one-to-one correspondence between strategies (as de-ned by the rst denition) and strategies in tree-form. This correspondencepreserves the tree structure of the domains of the strategies.The notion of P-substrategies in tree form beyond a legal position is a tech-nical notion used to prove the correspondence with Bohm trees.3 The Model of E-DialoguesCoquand [3] interprets proofs of the \Calculus of Noviko" as strategies in atwo-players game. The calculus is a (cut-free) sequent calculus (as LJ and LK ofGentzen) for innitary logic. The game is as in section 2 except for Opponent:the O-moves must be justied by the preceding P-move. Such a game is similarto Lorenzen's classical E-dialogues in Felscher [8].Here, we dene E-dialogues for classical Bohm trees.3.1 E-DialoguesThe E-dialogue GEA interpreting the type A is dened by its set of legal E-positions. A legal E-position on A is a legal position in GA which satises thefollowing extra condition:- O-moves are justied by the preceding P-move:For all even n 6= 0, we have pn = n  1.The justications of O-moves are trivial in E-dialogues. We do not write themin the sequel.An E-P-strategy for A is a P-strategy for the E-dialogue GEA.Proposition2. E-P-strategies for A and closed functional Bohm trees of typeA are isomorphic.Proof. We show rather the correspondence between E-P-strategies in tree formand numeric Bohm trees. Let  be a legal E-position of odd length. Let   bethe set of types asserted by Opponent (and thus attackable by Player) in . Let be the types of the questions asked by Opponent. We tag each type in   bya pair consisting of the move number when the type was asserted and of the
premise index (as in the denition of numeric Bohm trees). Similarly, we tageach base type in  by the move number when the question was asked. We showthat E-P-substrategies in tree form beyond  are isomorphic to evaluable Bohmtrees typed by the sequent (  ` ).For well-founded strategies and Bohm trees, the denition of the correspon-dence is by recursion on the tree structure:{ A P-attack [pi corresponds to an occurrence of the App rule with head-variable ( pi ). Branches indexed by an O-move correspond to subderivationsof the App rule. An O-attack [i corresponds to the ith left premise of the rule App (to-gether with the subsequent Abs rule). An O-answer ]ci corresponds to the ith right premise of the rule App.{ A P-answer ]pc corresponds to an occurrence of the Cst rule with constant cand type Cp.Finally, the initial move [ is in correspondence with the top Abs rule offunctional Bohm trees. Then, it is direct to show that the correspondence is anisomorphism respecting the tree structure.Hereafter, we write u for the E-P-strategy associated to the Bohm tree u.3.2 Coquand's DebateLet  be an E-P-strategy for A1; :::; An!C and ~ be a family of E-P-strategiesforA1; :::; An respectively. Since neither  and ~ are forced to playmoves justiedby the preceding opponent's move, it is not possible to directly let them interact.Coquand [3] proposed a way to let  and ~ interact in such a way that theinteraction computes a result for C. The idea of Coquand is as follows: at eachstep of the debate (which is a sequence of moves), there is a canonical way toextract a subsequence which is a legal E-position. From this legal E-position,the E-strategies can be applied. Following Hyland-Ong's terminology [11], wecall view the extracted E-position. However, in contrast with [11], when Player(resp Opponent) is to move, we keep in the view only the moves of Opponent(resp Player). This is sucient to apply the E-strategies.Roughly, the view (typically for P) of a legal position is obtained by forgettingthe moves which occur between an O-move and the P-move which justied it.Formally, the view V() of a legal sequence  = d0d1:::dn is recursivelydened as follows:- If dn = mp with p 6= 0 then V(d0:::dn) = V(d0:::dp 1)m- If dn = m0 then V(d0:::dn) = m- V(d0) = d0If the last move of  is a P-move, the view is an O-view. Otherwise, it is aP-view.
Each move in the view of  is a move in  with the justication dropped.The view renumbering sequence v , dened as follows, tells the number thatthe moves of the view have in .- If dn = mp with p 6= 0 then vd0:::dn = vd0:::dp 1n- If dn = m0 then vd0 :::dn = n- vd0 = 0If v = v0v1:::vn0 is the view renumbering sequence of . If d = mp is a movewith p  n0, we note v(d) for the move mvp .The debate dE(; ~ ) between  and ~ forms a legal position. Both  andthe  i in ~ are E-P-strategies but in the resulting play, who plays according to is Player and who plays according to the  i is Opponent. The rst move is aninitial attack of Opponent questioning C. Then, both players play in turn:d0 = [d2n+1 = vd0:::d2n ((V(d0:::d2n)))d2n+2 = vd0:::d2n+1 (~ (V(d0:::d2n+1)))dE(;  ) = d0d1:::dn:::where ~ (m0m1:::mq) is  i([m1:::mq) when m0 is [i.Thus, the view transposes the current state of the debate into a subsequenceof O-moves in an E-dialogue. From this, the player who is to move can apply itsstrategy. The view renumbering sequences serve to transpose back the justica-tion in the whole position.3.3 Debate Models Weak-Head ReductionLet u0 =  ~x0:0:t0 be a Bohm tree of type A1; :::; An!C and ~v0 a family ofBohm trees of respective types A1; :::; An. The debate dE(u0 ; ~v0) follows stepby step the weak-head reduction of u0 applied to ~v0.To express this correspondence, we consider the transposition dwh(u0; ~v0) ofthe weak-head reduction into a legal position. We annotate instances of the rstreduction rule by attacks and instances of the second by answers. A superscripton windows is necessary too. At the end, we add a dummy window ()[ ] in thesecond reduction rule (this simplies the numbering of windows in the nextproof).case xij(~u) of (~c! ~t)[e] wh(n)=[pj ! 1 t0[(~y  ~u; []~c! ~t)n[e]; ei]with e = w1; :::;wr and wi = (~xi  ~ui; [i]~ci ! ~ti)p[ei] and uij = ~y::t0.[i]cj[e] wh(n)=]pci ! 1 tij [()[ ]; ei]with e = w1; :::;wr and wi = (~xi  ~ui; [i]~ci ! ~ti)p[ei].
Starting from r0 = t0[( ~x0 ~v0; [0])0[ ]], we get the sequencer0 wh(1)=d1 ! 1 r1 wh(2)=d2 ! 1 ::: wh(n)=dn ! 1 rn wh(n+1)=dn+1 ! 1 :::We write dwh(u0; v0) for the sequence [; d1; :::; dn; :::.We now state the correspondence.Theorem3. If u0 is a closed Bohm tree of type A1; :::; An!C and ~v0 a familyof closed Bohm trees of respective types A1; :::; An then we havedwh(u0; ~v0) = dE(u0 ; ~v0)We need rst some denitions.We dene occurrences of evaluable Bohm trees and hat occurrences offunctional Bohm trees in a functional Bohm tree u. Bohm subtrees and P-viewsare in correspondence. To enforce this link, occurrences are taken to be P-views,i.e. sequences of O-moves with the justication dropped.{ ~x::t has hat occurrence b[ in itself{ t has occurrence [ in ~x::t{ If case xp(~y1:1:t1; :::;  ~yn:n:tn) of (c1 ! t01; :::; cq! t0q) has occur-rence  in u then ~yi:i:ti has hat occurrence c[i in u, ti has occurrence[i in u and t0i has occurrence ]ci in u.If u is a Bohm tree and  an occurrence of t in u, we dene uj as t. If ~vis a family of Bohm trees and  = [m1:::mn is an occurrence of t in vi, we let~vj[im1 :::mn = (vi)j. Similarly for hat occurrences.We can now give the proof.Proof. Let u0 =  ~x0:0:t0. Letr0 wh(1)=d1 ! 1 r1 wh(2)=d2 ! 1 ::: wh(n)=dn ! 1 rn wh(n+1)=dn+1 ! 1 :::be the weak-head reduction originating from r0 = t0[( ~x0  ~v0; [0])0[ ]]. Let be the debate dE(u0; ~v0). We note jn for the restriction of the debate to themoves 0 to n.We show by induction on n that rn = tn[en] where{ if n is even, tn = (u0)jV(jn)if n is odd, tn = (v0)jV(jn){ en is wqr ; :::;wq1 where r = jV(jn)j and qi+1 = vjn(i){ w0 is ( ~x0  ~v0; [0])0[ ]if q is odd (resp q is even) and (~v0)jV(jq) (resp (u0)jV(jq)) is a constant cthen wq+1 = ()[ ] otherwise wq+1 = ( ~xq  ~uq; [q ]~cq ! ~t0q)q [eq] where
 if q is even, uqj = (u0)j dV(jq)[j and t0qj = (u0)jV(jq)]cj (q 6= 0) if q is odd, uqj = (~v0)j dV(jq)[j and t0qj = (~v0)jV(jq)]cjClearly, r0 satises this property.Now if rn = tn[en], what happens for rn+1? We suppose n odd (the casen 6= 0 even is similar). We have to consider the two possible reduction steps:{ tn = case x(~u0) of (~c00! ~t00) with x = xqij in en and uqij = ~x0:0:t0rn+1 = t0[(~x0  ~u0; [0] ~c00! ~t00)n+1[en]; eqi ]In this case, we have wh(n+ 1) = [qij and V(jn+1) = V(jqi ) [j.We show rst that t0 = tn+1. We have uqij = (~v0)j dV(jq)[j . By denition ofthe view, we get uqij = (~v0)j dV(jn+1) and t0 = (~v0)jV(jn+1).Then, we show [(~x0  ~u0; [0]~c00 ! ~t00)n+1[en]; eqi ] = [en+1] = [wqr ; :::;wq1]with r = jV(jn+1)j and qi+1 = vjn+1 (i). By denition of the view, weactually have r = jV(jqi)j+1 = jV(jn+1)j. By denition of the view and ofeqi , the r rst windows actually are the windows wq1 to wqr 1 with qk+1 =vjn+1 (k). But also vjn+1 (r) = n+ 1. Then, u0j (= (u0)j dV(jq)[j by denitionof hat occurrences) is actually u(n+1)j and t00j (= (u0)jV(jq)]cj by denitionof occurrences) is actually t0(n+1)j.{ tn = []cj with  = qi in enrn+1 = t0qij[()[ ]; eqi ]Then we have wh(n+ 1) =]qicj and V(jn+1) = V(jqi ) ]cj .We show rst that t0qij = tn+1. We have t0qij = (~v0)jV(jqi )]cj . By denitionof the view, this means t0qij = (~v0)jV(jn+1) as wanted.We show then that [()[ ]; eqi ] = [en+1] = [wqr ; :::;wq1] with r = jV(jn+1)jand qi+1 = vjn+1 (i). As above, this comes by induction hypothesis for win-dows in eqi . Moreover, tn = (u0)jV(jn) is a constant and wn+1 is actuallydummy.This ends the proof4 The Model of Spread E-DialoguesThe E-dialogues are highly asymmetrical between Player and Opponent. A lib-eralization of the rules leads to the spread E-dialogues. These dialogues can beseen as a variant for classical PCF of Hyland-Ong's dialogues (see section 5).4.1 Spread E-DialoguesWe now allow Opponent to play moves justied by a P-move which is not thelast move of Player. However, to keep a kind of dialogue which constitutes amodel, we internalize the determinism w.r.t. the view in the rules of the game.This is the same view same move condition.
The spread E-dialogue GSA associated to A is dened by its set of legalspread E-positions. A legal spread E-position on A is a legal position  =d0d1:::dq in GA which satises the following extra condition:- same view same move conditionFor all n; n0  q, if V(jn) = V(jn0 ) then there is a move mp suchthat both dn+1 = vjn (mp) and dn0+1 = vjn0 (mp).A spread E-P-strategy for A is a P-strategy for the spread E-dialogueGSA. Similarly for an E-O-strategy. A spread E-strategy is either a spreadE-P-strategy or a spread E-O-strategy.4.2 E-P-Strategies and Spread E-StrategiesSince the moves in spread E-strategies are determined by the views (which aresequences of O-moves in E-dialogues), we can expect a bijection between E-P-strategies and spread E-strategies (whatever the strategy is for Player or forOpponent).In the rest of the section, we consider P-views of sequences of O-moves andO-views of sequences of P-moves. This makes sense since only the knowledge ofthe moves of other player are relevant in the denition of the view.Let  be an E-P-strategy for A. Let Dom() be the set of sequences  ofO-moves such that V() is inDom(). Let  be the extension of  onDom()dened by () = v((V())).Proposition4. If  is an E-P-strategy for A then  is a spread E-P-strategyfor A.Similarly, let ~ be a family of E-P-strategies for A1; :::; An respectively. LetDom(~+) be the set of sequences  of P-moves (replacing the rst move [0i by[) such that V() is in Dom(i). Let ~+ be dened on Dom(~+) by +() =v(i(V(0))) when  begins with [0i and 0 is obtained from  by replacing [0iby [.Proposition5. If ~ is a family of E-P-strategies for A1; :::; An then ~+ is aspread E-O-strategy for A1; :::; An!C.Conversely, a spread E-strategy can be restricted into a E-P-strategy bykeeping in the domain only the sequences which come from a legal E-position.Let  be a spread E-P-strategy forA. We deneDom()  as the set of sequences[m1:::mq of O-moves such that [m11:::m2q 1q is in Dom(). Similarly, let  bea spread E-O-strategy for A1; :::; An! C. For each i, we dene Dom() i asthe set of sequences [m1:::mq of O-moves such that [0im21:::m2qq is a sequence ofP-moves in Dom().Proposition6. 1. If  is a spread E-P-strategy for A then the restriction of on Dom()  is an E-P-strategy for A.
2. If  is a spread E-O-strategy for A1; :::; An!C then the restriction of  onDom() i is an E-P-strategy for Ai3. If  is an E-P-strategy for A then the restriction of  on Dom()  is .4. If ~ is a family of E-P-strategies for A1; :::; An respectively then the restric-tion of ~ + on Dom() i is  i.Corollary 7. The followings are in bijection:{ closed Bohm trees of type A{ E-P-strategies for A{ spread E-P-strategies for A.Also, the followings are in bijection:{ families of closed Bohm trees of respective types A1; :::; An{ families of E-P-strategies for A1; :::; An{ families of spread E-P-strategies for A1; :::; An{ spread E-O-strategies for A1; :::; An!C4.3 Interaction Between Spread E-StrategiesLet  be a spread E-P-strategy for A1; :::; An!C and ~ a family of spread E-P-strategies for A1; :::; An. By corollary 7, ~ can be seen as a spread E-O-strategy	 for A1; :::; An!C. Therefore, it is direct to dene an interaction between and ~ by letting  and 	 play the one against the other.We dene the debate dS(; ~ ) as follows:d0 = [d2n+1 = (d0d2:::d2n)d2n+2 = 	 (d1d3:::d2n+1)The interaction in a spread E-dialogue follows step by step the debate in anE-dialogue.Proposition8. If  is an E-P-strategy for A1; :::; An! C and ~ a family ofE-P-strategies for A1; :::; An respectively, then we havedE(; ~ ) = dS(; ~ +)Proof. Directly since () = v((V())) and similarly for ~ .Corollary 9. If u0 is a Bohm tree of type A1; :::; An!C and ~v0 is a family ofBohm trees of types A1; :::; An respectively then we havedwh(u0; ~v0) = dE(u0 ; ~v0) = dS(u0 ; ~v0+)
5 Intuitionistic PCF5.1 Syntax and Typing of Intuitionistic Bohm TreesIntuitionistic Bohm trees for PCF are dened by the following restrictedsyntax: t ::= case x(u; :::; u) of (c! t; :::; c! t) j cu ::= x; :::; x:tThese Bohm trees correspond, up to the undened 
, to Hyland-Ong's FiniteCanonical Forms of PCF [11].The typing rules for intuitionistic Bohm trees are:t : ( ;Ax11 ; :::; Axnn ` C)x1; :::; xn:t : (  ` A1; :::; An!C) Abs c is in C` c : (  ` C) Cstu1 : (  ` A1) : : : un : (  ` An) t1 : (  ` C) : : : tp : (  ` C)case x(u1; :::; un) of (c1 ! t1; :::; cp! tp) : (  ` C) Appwith (A1; :::; An!C 0)x in   and C 0 = fc1; :::; cpg5.2 Weak-Head ReductionEnvironments in the intuitionistic case do not name the continuations:s ::= t[e]e ::= w; :::;ww ::= (~x ~u;~c! ~t)[e]The (annotated) rules of reduction dier slightly from the ones of classicalcase. The rst rules becomescase xij(~u) of (~c! ~t)[e] wh(n)=[pj ! 1 t0[(~y  ~u;~c! ~t)n[e]; ei]with e = w1; :::;wr and wi = (~xi  ~ui; ~ci! ~ti)p[ei] and uij = ~y:t0. The secondbecomes cj [e] wh(n)=]pci ! 1 tij[()n[ ]; ei]with e = w1; :::;wr and wi = (~xi  ~ui; ~ci ! ~ti)p[ei] is the rst non dummywindow (starting fromw1). Thus, intuitionistic PCF returns constants to the lastpushed continuation while classical PCF allows to bypass an arbitrary numberof continuations.
5.3 Intuitionistic GamesIntuitionistic E-dialogues are E-dialogues where legal positions should satisfyanother extra rule.- Last asked rst answered condition.Let dn = ]pnc an answer, and n0 such that pn < n0 < n. If dn0 is anattack then there is n00 such that n0 < n00 < n and dn00 = ]n0c00 forsome c00. If dn0 = ]pn0c0 is an answer then pn0 6= pn.Similarly, we get intuitionistic spread E-dialogues by adding the above extracondition to the rules of (classical) spread E-dialogues.5.4 DebateThe denitions of the debates dE and dS are the same for intuitionistic andclassical games. Moreover, the propositions 2 and 3 and the corollaries 7 and 9still hold in the intuitionistic case.Intuitionistic spread E-dialogues can be understood as Hyland-Ong's gameswhere the innocence condition on strategies is now a rule of the game. As aconsequence, all spread E-O-strategies are innocent in our games and thereforein one-to-one correspondence with families of intuitionistic Bohm trees. On theother side, denability for Hyland-Ong's games states that even against a non-innocent opponent (for instance a non-deterministic player), we still have thebijection between P-strategies and Bohm trees.AcknowledgementThis work has bene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